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STRICT LIABILITY: AN UNWARRANTED LIMITATION
UPON THE MANUFACTURER'S DUTY TO PRODUCE A
REASONABLY SAFE PRODUCT-RIOS V. NIAGARA
MACHINE & TOOL WORKS
Since strict tort liability was first applied to manufactured products
in Illinois, I the trend has been to treat manufacturers and others within
the chain of distribution severely, holding them liable for all injuries,
both to person and property, arising out of the use of unreasonably
dangerous products.' The recent Illinois Supreme Court decision in Rios
v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works3 is at variance with this trend, and
if strictly applied, may halt the progress of products liability law in
Illinois.
1. Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill.2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965). The Illinois Su-
preme Court permanently abolished the requirements of privity and negligence in prod-
ucts liability and approved the application of strict tort liability to manufacturers of
products. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 (1965).
2. In Suvada, the court emphasized that strict liability was not to be equated with
absolute liability (e.g. that the manufacturer was not an insurer of his product). The
plaintiff was required to prove that the injury or damage resulted from an unreasonably
dangerous condition of the product which existed when it left the manufacturer's control.
32 Ill.2d at 619, 210 N.E.2d at 188.
During the next decade, these requirements were interpreted most favorably to the
consumer. Strict liability was applied to design defects as well as defects in manufacture.
Wright v. Massey-Harris, Inc., 68 Ill.App.2d 70, 215 N.E.2d 465 (5th Dist. 1966). A manu-
facturer is held to the degree of knowledge and skill of experts. This imposes a "duty ...
to keep abreast and informed of developments in his field, including safety devices and
equipment used in his industry with the type of product he manufactures." Moren v.
Samuel M. Langston Co., 96 Ill.App.2d 133, 145, 237 N.E.2d 759, 765 (1st Dist. 1968).
Defective products were defined as those "which are dangerous because they fail to per-
form in the manner reasonably to be expected in light of their nature and intended
function." Dunham v. Vaughn & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 Ill.2d 339, 342, 247 N.E.2d 401,
403 (1969). The theory of strict liability was applicable not only to manufacturers, but
also to sellers and suppliers of the product. Texaco, Inc. v. McGrew Lumber Co., 117
Ill.App.2d 351, 254 N.E.2d 584 (1st Dist. 1969). Contributory negligence was held not to
bar recovery in a strict tort liability action and plaintiff was not required to plead or prove
the exercise of due care. Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 I11.2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970).
It is not a valid defense for the manufacturer to contend that there is no practical or
theoretical way in which the unreasonably dangerous defect can be ascertained (plaintiff
allegedly contracted serum hepatitis from defective blood supplied in the course of treat-
ment). Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 47 Ill.2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970).
In proving the elements of a prima facie case in products liability, the plaintiff need not
specify wherein the product is defective. Larson v. Thomashow, 17 Ill.App.3d 208, 307
N.E.2d 707 (1st Dist. 1974). See Pope, Design Defect Cases: The Present State of Illinois
Products Liability Law, 8 JOHN MARSHALL J. OF PRAC. & PRoc. 351 (1975).
3. 59 Ill.2d 79, 319 N.E.2d 232 (1974).
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In Rios, plaintiff was injured in the course of his employment at the
Hammond Organ Company while operating a punch press4 manufac-
tured by the defendant, Niagara Machine and Tool Works. The press
was not equipped with a safety device by the manufacturer, other than
a nonrepeat device which prevented the ram from descending more than
once each time the foot pedal was depressed. At the time of the accident,
however, the press had been fitted with a Posson safety device5 by the
plaintiff's employer. Expert testimony at the trial level indicated that
the press was not reasonably safe for use in its manual operation without
a safety device.
The plaintiff testified that he inserted a part into the machine with
his right hand and then activated the machine. When the ram ascended,
he put his left hand into the machine to remove the finished part,
whereupon the ram descended a second time, severely injuring his hand.
The plaintiff testified that he had not depressed the foot pedal a second
time. Hammond's fabricating superintendent inspected the machine
after the accident and testified at trial that the nonrepeat device was
working properly. The parties stipulated that the Posson safety device
was inoperable at the time of the accident and that plaintiffs hand,
therefore, remained within the danger zone when the ram descended a
second time.' At trial, a jury found for the plaintiff.
The appellate court for the first district reversed. The court held that
where a machine is multi-functional and the type of device required to
make the machine reasonably safe for use in manual operations neces-
sarily varies with the function the machine is performing, the manufac-
turer has no duty to install a safety device.7 Emphasizing the necessity
of considering the reasonability of the duty imposed upon the manufac-
turer, the court found that it could not hold the manufacturer liable on
the basis of strict tort liability.
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision,
4. This punch press is capable of supplying a pressure equivalent to 45 tons. The press
may be used in two operations. The primary operation is automatic, and an operator is
necessary only to make certain an adequate supply of raw material is at hand. The
secondary operation is manual and requires that the operator place his hands within the
machine to place and remove the part to be finished. The ram is activated by depressing
a foot pedal.
An appropriate safety device is selected according to the type of dies installed and the
manner of operations. Hammond installed some type of safety device upon every press
before it was used in a secondary operation.
5. This device is attached to the operator and is designed to pull his hands away from
the machine as the ram descends.
6. 59 Ill.2d at 82-83, 319 N.E.2d at 234.
7. Rios v. Niagara Mach. & Tools Works, 12 Ill.App.3d 739, 745-46, 299 N.E.2d 86, 91
(1st Dist. 1973).
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but employed a different rationale, focusing upon two facts.8 First, the
purchaser had attached a safety device appropriate for the use being
made of the press. Second, there was no evidence that the failure of the
device installed by the purchaser was caused by the failure of the manu-
facturer to attach such a device. The court further stated that once a
safety device is attached by the purchaser, any unreasonably dangerous
conditions existing because of the lack of safety devices were fully cor-
rected.
A thread of public interest in human life and health runs through all
products liability decisions.' Courts have responded by protecting the
consumer who, in almost every instance, is less familiar with the prod-
uct and therefore is less aware of the dangers involved in its use than
the manufacturer. The courts have attempted to insure that manufac-
turers are more diligent in the design and manufacture of their products,
both by imposing greater duties on them and by placing the financial
burden where it is most equitable, namely, "on the one creating the risk
and reaping the profit."10 In Rios, however, the court appeared to totally
ignore the policy considerations which have been the basis for products
liability since its inception.
Although rarely moving as far and as quickly as the California and
New Jersey courts," Illinois courts have nevertheless continually ex-
panded the concept of products liability as established in Suvada v.
White Motor Co." The Rios decision, however, may signal an end to this
expansion. While it is clearly possible to avoid Rios in future products
8. 59 Ill.2d at 85, 319 N.E.2d at 236.
9. See Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 47 Ill.2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970);
Krammer v. Edward Hines Lumber Co., 16 Ill.App.3d 763, 306 N.E.2d 686 (1st Dist.
1974); Rivera v. Rockford Mach. & Tool Co., 1 Ill.App.3d 641, 274 N.E.2d 828 (lst Dist.
1971); Texaco, Inc. v. McGrew Lumber Co., 117 Ill. App.2d 351, 254 N.E.2d 584 (1st Dist.
1969).
10. Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill.2d 612, 619, 210 N.E.2d 182, 186 (1965).
11. The modem view of products liability was first adopted by the California Supreme
Court in Greenman v. Yuma Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.Rptr.
697 (1963). To this day, California has led the field of products liability favoring the
consumer. For example, California has held an automobile manufacturer to a duty to
produce a car that is reasonably safe in case of a crash. Badorek v. General Motors Corp.,
11 Cal.App.3d 902, 90 Cal.Rptr. 305 (1971). As early as 1972, California no longer required
proof that a product is unreasonably dangerous and held that a product is defective,
regardless of foreseeability, if it causes harm in its normal use. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson
Corp., 8 Cal.3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal.Rptr. 433 (1972). The furthest extension of
strict liability was in Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965)
where the court allowed recovery for purely economic loss.
12. 32 Il.2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
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liability disputes, it may long haunt Illinois products liability law. 3
CAUSATION
Suvada set out three requirements for the application of strict tort
liability to manufacturers:
The plaintiffs must prove that their injury or damage resulted from a
condition of the product, that the condition was an unreasonably dan-
gerous one, and that the condition existed at the time it left the manu-
facturer's control. 4
In an effort to meet the burden of Suvada, the plaintiff in Rios con-
tended that the malfunction of the purchaser-installed safety device was
not an independent intervening variable which would relieve the defen-
dant of its liability. The court, however, agreed with the defendant and
found no evidence that the injury was caused by the fact that the ma-
chine was not equipped with a safety device when it left the defendant's
control. Thus, with one of the three aforementioned elements lacking
-the injury did not result from a condition of the press-the supreme
court could not allow the trial court's judgment to stand.
This rationale, however, lacks support. At the trial level, the issue of
causation was left to the jury. It is fundamental that a reviewing court's
authority to substitute its own findings of fact for those of the jury is
very limited. 5 The reluctance to disregard the findings of a jury unless
13. See text at notes 29-32 infra.
14. 32 Ill.2d at 623, 210 N.E.2d at 188. It should be noted that "not reasonably safe"
has been suggested as a more appropriate term, since "unreasonably dangerous" seems
to imply that something can be "reasonably dangerous." Wade, Strict Tort Liability of
Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965). The use of the term "unreasonably dangerous" seems
to be avoided in some Illinois decisions. See Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp.,
47 Ill.2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970); Dunham v. Vaughn & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 Ill.2d
339, 247 N.E.2d 401 (1969); Scott v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., 26 Ill.App.3d 971, 326
N.E.2d 74, 84 (1st Dist. 1975) ("reasonably safe").
15. ILL. REV. STAT. ch.110A, §366(b)(1)(ii) (1973) provides:
Any error of fact, in that the judgement or order appealed from is not sustained
by the evidence or is against the weight of the evidence, may be brought up for
review.
Cases interpreting this rule have held that the findings of a jury cannot be disturbed by a
reviewing court unless they are clearly erroneous or against the manifest weight of the
evidence. Wallace v. Blue Cross Hosp. Serv., Inc., 13 Ill.App.3d 803, 300 N.E.2d 531 (5th
Dist. 1973). It has been especially emphasized that a jury's resolution of fact questions
may not be set aside merely because the judge feels a different conclusion is more reason-
able. Hamas v. Payne, 107 Ill.App.2d 316, 246 N.E.2d 1 (2d Dist. 1969). The jury verdict
will not be set aside on the basis of manifest weight of the evidence unless the opposite
conclusion is indisputable. Morrison v. Mitchell, 96 Ill. App.2d 332, 239 N.E.2d 289 (3d
Dist. 1968).
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they are clearly erroneous has been clearly manifested in products liabil-
ity cases. 6 The court does not clarify whether the reversal is a substitu-
tion of findings of fact or a reversal as a matter of law. It is reasonable
to assume that the court would have explained a reversal based on issues
of fact. Its failure to do so leads to the conclusion that it was establishing
a rule of law with regard to causation in cases where a purchaser takes
it upon himself to correct any unreasonably dangerous aspects of a
product.
This reasoning necessarily precludes consideration by the trier of fact
of the question of
• . .whether it was foreseeable that the plaintiff's employer might in-
stall an insufficient or defective safety device mechanism, thereby re-
quiring the defendant to include an adequate safety device aside from
the so-called 'nonrepeat feature' of the punch press."
As the dissenting opinion points out, it is quite reasonable to conclude
that the jury found it was foreseeable that Hammond would install an
inoperable safety mechanism and that it was not infeasible for the de-
fendant to install some additional safety device. The jury was, therefore,
justified in holding the defendant liable for injuries to the plaintiff aris-
ing from the manufacturer's failure to provide such a feature. Moreover,
there is clear precedent for leaving such a determination to the jury.'8
But the significance of Rios extends beyond the problem of causation,
because in taking the question of foreseeability from the jury, the court
raises the more profound issue of a manufacturer's duty to deliver a
reasonably safe product. It appears that the greatest impact of Rios will
ultimately be on that matter.
MANUFACTURER'S DUTY
The court cites Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co.'" and Bexiga v. Havir
16. In Krammer v. Edward Hines Lumber Co., 16 Ill.App.3d 763, 306 N.E.2d 686 (1st
Dist. 1974), the court refused to reverse a jury's determination of the issues of whether
the injuries were caused by a defective plank or misuse, or whether the supplier could have
foreseen the use to which a plank would be put and could have warned against it. The
court in Collins v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 21 Ill.App.3d 1037, 315 N.E.2d 670 (4th Dist.
1974), held that the evidence was sufficient for submission to the jury on the issue of
defective design of a ladder. In Wells v. Web Mfg. Co., 20 Ill.App.3d 545, 315 N.E.2d 301
(lst Dist. 1974), the court found that the issue of proximate cause was for the jury.
17. 59 Ill.2d at 88, 319 N.E.2d at 237 (Kluczynski, J., dissenting).
18. Rivera v. Rockford Mach. & Tool Co., 1 Ill.App.3d 641, 274 N.E.2d 828 (lst Dist.
1971). In that case the court held that the resolution of the issue of whether the defendant's
machine was unreasonably dangerous for failure to incorporate certain safety devices
which were available at the time the machine left the manufacturer's control was the
function of the jury.
19. 61 Cal.2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal.Rptr. 896 (1964). An automobile manufacturer
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Manufacturing Corp.02 in support of its holding; however, both cases
espouse a position contrary to Rios. Those decisions strongly emphasize
that a manufacturer may not delegate his duty to deliver his product in
a reasonably safe condition.
In Bexiga, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that when a machine
is unreasonably dangerous due to the lack of a safety device, the jury
may infer that the machine was defective in design, unless it can be
found that incorporation of a safety device would render the machine
useless for its intended purpose." The defendant contended that a state
statute requiring purchasers to install a safety device on all such ma-
chines alleviated him of the duty to deliver a safe product. Additionally,
he asserted that it was the custom of the industry for purchasers to
install such devices. The court found these contentions to be an insuffi-
cient basis for making an exception to the rule of non-delegability.
The Rios court distinguished Bexiga on the ground that Hammond
had installed a safety device, whereas the basic design of the press in
Bexiga contained no safety devices and none were installed by the pur-
chaser.2" This distinction is unacceptable. The Bexiga court noted that
the violation of a statutory duty imposed upon the purchaser would not
justify a finding that the manufacturer was not liable for selling a ma-
chine that was unreasonably dangerous. 3 It would appear easier to re-
frain from imposing liability on the manufacturer of a punch press when
a state statute requires the purchaser to install a safety device and he
fails to do so, than where no state statute exists imposing such a duty.
In the former situation, it is probable that the legislature recognized the
danger involved in the operation of such machines and felt justified in
placing the burden on the purchaser to make the machine safe for use.
No such justification existed in Rios. Nevertheless, the Illinois court, in
recognition of the non-delegable duty of a manufacturer quoted Bexiga:
The public interest in assuring that safety devices are installed de-
mands more from the manufacturer than to permit him to leave such
relied on the dealer to make the final inspection and corrections necessary to make the
cars safe for use. The court held that it was error to grant a nonsuit as to the plaintiff's
cause of action against the manufacturer, because the manufacturer had a non-delegable
duty to deliver the car in a reasonably safe condition and therefore could not escape
liability.
20. 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972).
21. An even stricter approach has been taken in Illinois. A manufacturer has been
required to adopt any and all devices necessary to render his product reasonably safe. See
Mahoney v. Roper-Wright Mfg. Co., 490 F.2d 229 (7th Cir. 1973); Rivera v. Rockford
Mach. & Tool Co., 1 Ill.App.2d 641, 274 N.E.2d 878 (1st Dist. 1971).
22. 59 Ill.2d at 85, 319 N.E.2d at 236.
23. 60 N.J. at 410, 290 A.2d at 285.
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a critical phase of his manufacturing process to the haphazard conduct
of the ultimate purchaser. The only way to be certain that such devices
will be installed on all machines-which clearly the public interest
requires-is to place the duty on the manufacturer where it is feasible
for him to do so."
This recognition of the rule of non-delegability, however, was followed
by the court's holding that this rule was inapplicable under circumstan-
ces where the employer attached a safety device to the machine. The
court further noted that this conduct of the employer corrected whatever
unreasonably dangerous conditions existed as a consequence of the ab-
sence of a safety device when it left the manufacturer's control.25
In effect, this shifts the burden of producing a safe product upon one
who fortuitously installs a device which becomes inoperable, a duty
which the court purports to characterize as non-delegable. Illinois
courts, however, have previously dealt with the question of duty to
install safety devices and have taken a view consistent with the policy
reasons underlying all products liability law.2" In Rivera v. Rockford
Machine and Tool Co. ,7 the appellate court found that the trier of fact
must be allowed to consider methods and devices which were available
at the time the machine left the manufacturer's control, even if they
were not generally adopted in the industry. For policy reasons, such
information was necessary to determine whether the plaintiff was ex-
posed to an unreasonable danger in using the defendant's product. The
Rivera court noted:
If such were not the case, manufacturers would be free to ignore the
risks attendant to the use of their products secure in their knowledge
24. 59 Ill.2d at 85, 319 N.E.2d at 235 citing Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. at 410,
290 A.2d at 285.
25. 59 Ill.2d at 85, 319 N.E.2d at 235-36. The court does, however, indicate that the
manufacturer might have been liable for the plaintiff's injuries had the failure of the
purchaser-installed device been caused by "[e]xcessive wear, defective construction,
improper maintenance, failure to properly attach it to the machine or a defect in the
machine itself .. " Id., 319 N.E.2d at 236.
26. In Wells v. Web Mfg. Co., 20 Ill.App.3d 545, 315 N.E.2d 301 (1st Dist. 1974), the
manufacturer was held liable for an unreasonably dangerous defect even though the defect
was due to the malfunction of a part replaced by the purchaser. The court stated that
"... the suggested authority. . . that intervening negligence or misconduct of a third
person disrupts the causal relationship is totally inapplicable to the facts here .. " 20
Ill.App.3d at 553, 315 N.E.2d at 309. In Rivera v. Rockford Mach. & Tool Co., 1 Ill. App.3d
641, 274 N.E.2d 828 (lst Dist. 1971), the manufacturer of a punch press was held liable
for injuries to the plaintiff even though the machine's malfunction was caused by a limit
switch which had been both manufactured and installed by the purchaser.
27. 1 Ill.App.3d 641, 274 N.E.2d 828 (lst Dist. 1971).
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that their own failure to adopt new developments, techniques or de-
vices to practical use will shield them from liability. 8
The Rivera court proposed that the manufacturer must not only insure
the reasonable safety of his machine, but must continue to search for
and develop safety techniques and devices to be used with it. Clearly,
products liability law would have taken a significant step forward had
the Rios court followed this position.
CONCLUSION
The Rios decision may signal a retreat from the policy reasons which
have formed the basis for strict tort liability. The decision is capable of
leading to the same result the appellate court was trying to avoid in
Rivera. Certainly, if Rios is extended, the manufacturer may be assured
that he need not worry about liability attaching to his failure to provide
safety devices, much less develop or perfect them.
Fortunately, one appellate court recognized this danger and applied
Rios narrowly. As evidenced in Scott v. Dreis and Krump Manufactur-
ing Co., 9 however, this narrow application can not and will not negate
the confusion Rios may cause in the field of products liability.2 " In Scott,
the operator of a press brake brought an action based on strict tort
liability against the manufacturer for injuries sustained when the ram
fell on his hand. Both the manufacturer and the purchaser had failed
to install any safety device. Based on the rule of non-delegability, the
court rejected the defendant's argument that the sole proximate cause
of the accident was the purchaser's failure to install a safety device.3'
The difference between Scott and Rios was in the conduct of the two
28. Id. at 647-48, 274 N.E.2d at 833.
29. 26 Ill.App.3d 971, 326 N.E.2d 74 (lst Dist. 1975).
30. The language of Scott taken together with Rios simply serves to increase this confu-
sion. The Scott court read Rios as indicating that the supreme court's holding on the issue
of causation was
... addressed to the character of the instrumentality, not the conduct of the
employer. In the instant case, unlike Rios, the unreasonably dangerous condi-
tion of the press alleged in the complaint existed both at the time the press left
the defendant's control and at the time of the plaintiff's injury.
Id. at 986 n. 3, 326 N.E.2d at 84 n. 3. Further, based upon its interpretation of Rios, the
Scott court held ". . . that a manufacturer is under a non-delegable duty to produce a
product which is reasonably safe and that such duty is not obviated when a multifunc-
tional machine is placed into the stream of commerce." Id. at 986, 326 N.E.2d at 84. The
statements are difficult to reconcile with the language in Rios. In effect, the conduct of
the employer/purchaser was decisive and the manufacturer was allowed to delegate his
duty. See text accompanying note 24 infra.
31. 26 IIl.App.3d at 986, 326 N.E.2d at 84.
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purchasers; but it is illogical that a manufacturer's liability should be
dependent upon the actions of a third party. In strict liability, the
conduct of a third party is generally not in issue.2 The basis of liability
is the condition of the product.
The greatest potential for harm, however, lies in the possibility that
the Rios decision will undermine the public policy foundation of prod-
ucts liability law.3 While Scott indicates that the danger of Rios being
extended may be minimal, it is nonetheless quite discouraging that the
Illinois Supreme Court felt justified in ignoring the policy reasons which
are the raison d'etre of products liability law. 4 The supreme court's
disregard of these considerations in Rios may spell the end of its hereto-
fore receptive attitude towards products liability claims.
Rima L. Skorubskas
32. See, e.g., Kossifos v. Louden Mach. Co., 22 Ill.App.3d 587, 317 N.E.2d 749 (1st Dist.
1974), in which a manufacturer held strictly liable was denied indemnity from a third
party who had carelessly installed and maintained the manufacturer's product. But cf.
Young v. Aeroil Prods. Co., 248 F.2d 185 (9th Cir. 1957) (material alteration); Zesch v.
Abrasive Co. of Philadelphia, 354 Mo. 1147, 193 S.W.2d 581 (1946) (mishandling). It is
unclear whether Rios can be classified as an alteration case because of the failure of the
court to discuss it in those terms.
33. It is unfortunate that the supreme court found it necessary to reject the approach
the appellate court took in Rios, focusing on the multi-functional aspect of the machine.
Requiring the manufacturer of a multi-functional machine, where each function may
demand a different safety device, to attach an appropriate safety mechanism admittedly
places a great burden on him. Nevertheless, the public interest demands that the manu-
facturer be liable for injuries which could have been avoided through his reasonable
efforts. Therefore, while even the appellate court's decision may have been too lax in its
requirements on manufacturers, its decision was more narrowly drawn and more reasona-
ble than that of the supreme court. First, the appellate court's holding clearly could not
be applied to machines which are not multi-functional. Second, it focuses on the charac-
teristics of the machine in question and on the manufacturer's actions rather than on the
haphazard activity of a third person.
34. Decisions such as Rios will cause the ultimate loss to be absorbed by the employee
who, in most cases, will be barred from bringing an action against his employer because
of the statutory remedy under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Moreover, the remedies
thereunder are usually inadequate to fully compensate for serious injuries.
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